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Abstract
This paper aims to rethink the idea of constitution-
al renewal through a dissection of Richard Albert’s 
ground-breaking concept of constitutional dismember-
ment. It is contended that under the rubric of constitu-
tional dismemberment are two exceptional constitu-
tional phenomena: the ought-to-be declared nullity of 
unconstitutional constitutional amendments and the 
legal unity-defying, extraconstitutional expression of 
what Hannah Arendt called “natality” in political action. 
The thesis is that attempts to tame revolutionary con-
stitutional alteration with designed rules as to formal 
constitutional change as Albert’s illustrates are missing 
the meaning of constitution-making for a natality-driven 
constitutional renewal characteristically defies designed 
constitutional form. The concept of constitutional dis-
memberment is first dissected in light of Arendt’s idea of 
natality. With constitutional dismemberment unpacked, 
Resumo
O objetivo deste trabalho é repensar a ideia de renovação 
constitucional através de uma análise do inovador concei-
to de desmembramento constitucional de Richard Albert. 
Alega-se que, sob a rubrica do desmembramento constitu-
cional, há dois fenômenos constitucionais excepcionais: a 
necessária declaração de nulidade de emendas constitucio-
nais inconstitucionais e a extraconstitucional expressão do 
que Hannah Arendt chamou de “natalidade” em ação po-
lítica. A tese é que tentativas de domar as alterações cons-
titucionais revolucionárias através de regras desenhadas 
como mudanças formais à Constituição, como mostrado 
por Albert, carecem do significado de constitution-making 
para uma renovação constitucional guiada pela natalida-
de, desafiando a forma do constitucionalismo desenhado. 
O conceito de desmembramento constitucional é primeiro 
analisado sob a luz da ideia de natalidade de Arendt. Após 
isso, na sequência observa-se que o constitution-making 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Richard Albert takes studies of constitutional change to another level with his 
erudite work “Constitutional Amendments.”1 As he sets out in the beginning, the objec-
tive of Constitutional Amendments is “to bring formal amendment back to the center of 
the field of constitutional change.”2 This reveals Albert’s ambitious project “to guide tho-
se seeking to understand how constitutions change” with the hopes for “inspir[ing] 
interest in constitutional amendment.”3 Notably, Albert’s target audience is not li-
1  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. In line with Albert’s usage, I use constitutional change and con-
stitutional alteration interchangeably, which include what Albert calls constitutional amendment (proper) and 
constitutional dismemberment unless otherwise specified. Notably, as suggested throughout Constitutional 
Amendments, constitutional change may take place formally and informally. Formal constitutional change re-
fers to the direct alteration of the text of the codified constitution or other constitutional laws sitting on the 
top order of the hierarchical legal system; informal constitutional change refers to such alterations taking place 
through judicial interpretation, legislative enactment, or political practice. Both formal and informal constitu-
tional change/ alteration include amendment and dismemberment. Unless otherwise specified, my discussion 
centers on formal constitutional change. As regards another form of constitutional change – the making of a 
new constitution, it is referred to as constitutional replacement. All forms of constitutional change are consid-
ered the means of constitutional renewal.  
2  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 2.
3  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 36.
it is further observed that the constitution-making trans-
mutes into the formal pronouncement of a new codified 
constitution in Albert’s rigid tripartite classification of 
constitutional changes into amendment, dismember-
ment, and enactment. Albert therefore inadvertently 
reduces constitution-making to the formal enactment 
of a new codified constitution with constitutional natal-
ity dismembered and constitutional renewal hollowed 
out. It is concluded that Albert’s formalistic conceptual 
framework of constitutional change reflects the central-
ity of comparative written constitutions in the place of 
comparative constitutional phenomena in current com-
parative constitutional studies.
Keywords: constitutional renewal; constitutional dis-
memberment; constitutional amendment; Richard Albert; 
natality.
se transmuta em pronunciamentos formais de uma nova 
Constituição codificada na rígida classificação tripartida de 
Albert em emenda, desmembramento e promulgação. Al-
bert, assim, inadvertidamente reduz o constitution-making 
à promulgação formal de uma nova Constituição codifica-
da com natalidade constitucional desmembrada e reno-
vação constitucional esvaziada. Conclui-se que o conceito 
formalista de Albert sobre mudança constitucional reflete 
a centralidade da comparação de constituições escritas no 
lugar da comparação de fenômenos constitucionais nos 
atuais estudos de direito comparado.
 
Palavras-chave: renovação constitucional; desmembra-
mento constitucional; emenda constitucional; Richard Al-
bert; natalidade.
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mited to those living in the ivory tower. “[L]eaders involved in making or remaking 
their constitution” are also whom Constitutional Amendments is pitching.4 Guided by 
the foregoing goals, Albert presents us – yes, those living in the ivory tower – with a 
360-degree study of formal constitutional amendment. Standing out from the already 
crowded field of constitutional change,5 Constitutional Amendments rests on Albert’s 
ground-breaking discovery of “constitutional dismemberment” amidst manifold formal 
constitutional alterations aimed at constitutional renewal.6 
Notably, applying his theory to constitutional practice with the leaders involved 
in constitution-(re)making in mind, Albert suggests that constitutional identity-chan-
ging dismemberment7 be constitutionalized alongside amendment in the design of 
the constitutional rules governing formal changes so that transformative and revolu-
tionary constitutional alterations can take place without disrupting “legal continuity,” 
while the rule of law can therefore be upheld.8 As will be revealed, Albert moves betwe-
en roles in three dimensions in Constitutional Amendments: constitutional designer vs 
constitutional comparatist; substantivist vs formalist; general constitutional theorist vs 
written constitutionalism defender. Reflecting its author’s multiple identities, Constitu-
tional Amendments is not only erudite but also intricate. Thus, in answering Albert’s call 
for further inquiry into constitutional change,9 my contribution surely falls far short of 
engaging with his encyclopaedic work on constitutional change comprehensively. Ra-
ther, I aim to rethink the idea of constitutional renewal through an engaged dissection 
of Albert’s newly discovered, yet-to-be-explored constitutional dismemberment in the 
world of formal (or codified) constitutional change. 
4  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 36.
5  See, e.g., ACKERMAN, Bruce. We the People. vols. 1-3. Cambridge: Belknap, 1991-2014; ACKERMAN, Bruce. 
Revolutionary Constitutions: Charismatic Leadership and the Rule of Law. Cambridge: Belknap, 2019; ARATO, 
Andrew. Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000; ARATO, An-
drew. Post Sovereign Constitution Making: Learning and Legitimacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016; 
ARATO, Andrew. The Adventures of the Constituent Power: Beyond Revolutions? Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017; GINSBURG, Tom. Comparative Constitutional Design. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2012; BEUKERS, Thomas; de WITTE, Bruno; KILPATRICK, Claire. Constitutional Change through 
Euro-Crisis Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017; ALBERT, Richard; BERNAL, Carlos; BENVINDO, 
Juliano Zaiden. Constitutional Change and Transformation in Latin America. Oxford: Hart, 2019; CONTIA-
DES, Xenophon. Engineering Constitutional Change: A Comparative Perspective on Europe, Canada and the 
USA. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013. 
6  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 61-92.
7  Albert distinguishes between three types of constitutional dismemberment in terms of fundamental 
rights, basic structure, and constitutional identity. See ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Mak-
ing, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 85-86. 
8  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 263-64.
9  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 36.
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As Albert’s loyal interlocutor, I argue that under the rubric of constitutional dis-
memberment are two exceptional constitutional phenomena in the real-world consti-
tutional practice: the ought-to-be declared nullity of unconstitutional (formal) consti-
tutional amendments and the legal unity-defying, extraconstitutional (or unconventio-
nal) expression of what Hannah Arendt called one of “the most general condition[s] of 
human existence” – the “natality” in (political) “action.”10 Despite Arendt’s observation 
that “startling unexpectedness” inherent in natality underlies political action,11 Albert 
insists that there be no space for an identity-altering constitutional renewal – which 
results from natality-driven political action – within an existing constitution that makes 
no distinction between amendment and dismemberment in its provisions governing 
formal changes.12 In such constitutional arrangements, an identity-altering constitutio-
nal amendment boils down to a disguised constitutional dismemberment that ought 
to be nullified, regardless of its political underpinnings. Based on the legalistic stance 
on what counts as constitutional identity off limits to constitutional amendment,13 Al-
bert’s foregoing insistence may suck the air out of fundamental constitutional renewal 
engendered by a rule-challenging, form-resisting political action. As a result, Albert 
inadvertently reduces constitution-making to the formal enactment of a new codified 
constitution. 
My thesis is that a natality-driven constitutional renewal characteristically de-
fies designed “constitutional form,”14 suggesting that attempts to tame revolutionary 
constitutional alteration with designed differentiated rules as to formal constitutional 
change as Albert’s theory illustrates are missing the meaning of constitution-making. 
Even in Albert’s designed world of ideal written constitutions wherein processes for 
identity-altering constitutional change are incorporated,15 revolutionary change may 
result from an unconventional use of such codified processes at the expense of the re-
levant constitutional rules. Also, the relationship between the real-world constitutions 
and political action looks even more refracted through Albert’s conceptual prism, sug-
gesting the hollowing out of constitutional renewal and the underlying idea of natality. 
Looked at through the lens of Albert’s tripartite classification of constitutional change 
10  ARENDT, Hannah. The Human Condition. 2. ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 8-9.
11  ARENDT, Hannah. The Human Condition. 2. ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 176-78.
12  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 85, 189-90.
13  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 84-85. 
14  See LOUGHLIN Martin; WALKER, Neil. Introduction. In: LOUGHLIN, Martin; WALKER, Neil. The Paradox of 
Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 1-2.
15  As regards the provision for constitutional dismemberment in current national constitutions, Albert men-
tions Austria, Costa Rica, Spain, and Switzerland. ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, 
Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 191-92, 309 n 62.
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– amendment, dismemberment, and enactment, some real-world instances of genui-
ne fundamental constitutional renewal are doomed to be condemned for dismembe-
ring or otherwise unlawfully altering the existing constitution, while other real-world 
constitutions that are anything but a function of Arendtian political action are praised 
for their role in constitutional renewal. My argument unfolds as follows. First, I situate 
Albert’s concept of constitutional dismemberment in the global constitutional landsca-
pe and provide a dissection of constitutional dismemberment in light of Arendt’s idea 
of natality, suggesting that not all instances of constitutional dismemberment should 
be treated as ultra vires amendments that ought to be nullified ex ante or ex post. Af-
ter unpacking constitutional dismemberment, I then show why Albert’s rigid tripartite 
classification of constitutional change suggests a formalistic approach to constitution-
-making under which constitutional natality is dismembered. I conclude with remarks 
on the formalistic turn in comparative constitutional law scholarship as reflected in 
Constitutional Amendments.      
2. DISMEMBERMENT DISAGGREGATED: CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT ON TRIAL
As the Indian Supreme Court’s German jurisprudence-inspired “basic structure 
doctrine” continues to migrate to various constitutional realms, scholarship on consti-
tutional amendment has been embedded in a binary aptitude as connoted by the con-
cept of “unconstitutional constitutional amendment”.16 From the “internal” perspective 
of the existing constitution, an amendment is either constitutional or unconstitutional, 
depending on its coherence with the identity of the existing one.17 Yet, the question of 
the identity of a transformative formal constitutional change reveals another binary 
attitude taking hold in current constitutional scholarship when looked at from outsi-
de the existing constitution: it must either continue with the existing constitution or 
mark a constitutional new beginning. Challenging the prevalent binary propensity in 
current studies of constitutional change, Albert puts forward the midway concept of 
constitutional dismemberment with an eye to providing a better and discriminating 
analytic framework of constitutional change.18 Summarily, an identity-altering formal 
constitutional change does not properly amend a constitution as it deviates from the 
16  ROZNAI, Yaniv. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2017, p 42-69.
17  HARRIS, II, William F. The Interpretable Constitution. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 199, 
p. 176; KUO, Ming-Sung. Reconciling constitutionalism with power: towards a constitutional nomos of political 
ordering. Ratio Juris, vol. 23, n. 3, Sep./ Nov. 2010, p. 397-98. See also KAHN, Paul W. The Reign of Law: Mar-
bury v. Madison and the Construction of Law. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997, p. 63-64.
18  Albert considers constitutional dismemberment “the middle ground” that “serves as a bridge between 
[amendment and a new constitution].” ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and 
Changing Constitutions. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 85.
MING-SUNG KUO
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 7, n. 3, p. 773-794, set./dez. 2020.778 
latter’s existing fundamentals. Nor does it mark a constitutional new beginning in that 
the continuation of the existing constitution it effectively breaks with is still exhibited in 
a very visible form. Such identity-altering formal constitutional change dismembers the 
existing constitution by giving an alternative identity to its remaining form.19 
It comes as no surprise that Albert’s concept of constitutional dismemberment 
is not the first theoretical endeavour to transcend the binary stance pervading analyses 
of constitutional change. Prompted by the constantly changing constitutional order in 
Weimar Germany, scholars such as Georg Jellinek and Carl Schmitt meticulously dis-
tinguished between varieties of constitutional change on the conceptual level with an 
eye to delineating the limits of constitutional amendment.20 Unlike the Weimar crisis-
-prompted theories, Albert’s midway concept benefits from decades, if not centuries, of 
constitutional practices across the globe. Nevertheless, as with Germanophone cons-
titutional theories that were in response to the particular constitutional environment 
in Weimar, Albert’s constitutional dismemberment is situated in the current condition 
of constitutional change. As noted above, the recognition of unconstitutional consti-
tutional amendments is one of the most important developments in the landscape of 
comparative constitutional law.21 More importantly, the continuing migration of the 
doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment indicates the increase of trans-
formative and revolutionary constitutional changes in the guise of formal amendments 
in various constitutional realm and the concomitant judicial response.22 The ultimate 
goal of distinguishing constitutional dismemberment from constitutional amendment 
is the taming of that increasing constitutional phenomenon.
Albert carves out constitutional dismemberment from constitutional amend-
ment in terms of subject, authority, scope, and purpose.23 Among them, scope is the 
“overriding feature.”24 Aimed at correction, elaboration, reformation, or restoration,25 
19  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 68-82.
20  JELLINEK, Georg. Constitutional amendment and constitutional transformation (1906). In: JACOBSON, Ar-
thur J.; SCHLINK, Bernard. Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000, p. 
54-56; SCHMITT, Carl. Constitutional Theory. Translated and edited by Jeffrey Seitzer. Durhnam: Duke Univer-
sity Press, 2007, p. 147-48.
21  See ROZNAI, Yaniv. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 6.
22  For the migration of the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment, see ROZNAI, Yaniv. Un-
constitutional constitutional amendments—the migration and success of a constitutional idea. American 
Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 61, n. 3, summer, 2013, p. 657-720
23  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 79-80.
24  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 82.
25  Ibid ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Ox-
ford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 80.
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an amendment is delimited by “constitutional identity.”26 In other words, “[a] consti-
tutional amendment entails unbroken unity with the constitution being amended” 
while “continu[ing]the constitution-making project initiated at the founding or in in-
tervening moments of refounding of the constitution.”27 In sum, “[a]n amendment is 
an authoritative change to higher law that corrects, elaborates, reforms, or restores the 
meaning of the constitution consistent with its existing framework and fundamental 
presuppositions.”28 
The way that Albert defines amendment indicates the “formal” character of the 
distinction he draws between amendment and dismemberment. What distinguishes 
dismemberment from amendment is that the former breaks “unity” with the existing 
constitution or alters its “framework” or “fundamental presuppositions” and thereby 
disrupts the constitution-making project initiated at constitutional (re)founding. Thus, 
Albert contends that “[t]he theory of constitutional dismemberment is not rooted in a 
normative understanding of the constitution.”29 The identity of the existing constitution 
itself decides whether a formal constitutional change is a unity-entailed amendment 
or an identity-altering dismemberment. This reveals the formalistic element of Albert’s 
theory of constitutional amendment. So does Albert’s identification of a new consti-
tution. A new constitution must take the form of a new constitution with the status of 
higher law enacted outside the replaced constitution.30 
Yet, a closer look at Albert’s “content-based approach” to the distinction betwe-
en amendment and dismemberment31 suggests that Albert is not as formalistic as the 
foregoing suggests. Constitutional identity that decides whether a formal alteration 
breaks or preserves the unity of the constitution being altered is not the only object 
of constitutional dismemberment. “[T]he repeal or replacement of a fundamental ri-
ght protected by the constitution…that is central to the political community” and a 
fundamental alteration of the allocation of constitutional powers and other core ele-
ments of the central structure of the constitution are also instances of constitutional 
26  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 79.
27  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 79.
28  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 82 (emphasis added).
29  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 84.
30  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 76.
31  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 78.
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dismemberment.32 Whether the last two varieties are merely instances of altering 
constitutional identity is debatable.33 Of particular pertinence to my present discus-
sion, however, is the way that a formal change to fundamental rights enshrined in the 
constitution is considered dismemberment under Albert’s theory and what it tells of 
his theoretical position. Notably, it is repeal or replacement that would render such an 
alternation constitution-dismembering.34 As a corollary, neither enhancement of an 
existing fundamental right nor addition of a new right to the constitutional bill of rights 
will dismember the constitution. It is true that they may still be considered constitu-
tional dismemberment for altering constitutional identity in the event. Nevertheless, 
the asymmetrical stance Albert takes towards the alteration of fundamental rights in 
identifying instances of constitutional dismemberment reveals the indelible normative 
characteristic of Albert’s theory. 
The normative element implicit in the theory of constitutional dismember-
ment is further evidenced in Albert’s attitude towards the doctrine of unconstitutional 
constitutional amendment. To Albert, those ostensible amendments that have been 
declared unconstitutional are attempts to “do more than correct, elaborate, reform, or 
restore the [relevant] constitution[s] within [their] boundaries and presuppositions.”35 It 
is true that such amendments may be declared unconstitutional for reasons other than 
substantive constitutional norms. Yet, the most interesting cases involving this doctrine 
exist where an ostensible amendment is declared unconstitutional even if the relevant 
constitution does not include “the eternity clause” that would render some constitu-
tional provisions unamendable.36 In such cases, judicial renderings of unconstitutional 
constitutional amendment have relied on implicit substantive normative requirements 
“discovered” and pronounced by the court.37 Taken together, unless they are otherwise 
constitutionalized, formal constitutional alterations that dismember the constitution 
32  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 85.
33  See POLZIN, Monika. Constitutional identity, unconstitutional amendments and the idea of constituent 
power: the development of the doctrine of constitutional identity in German constitutional law. International 
Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 14, n. 2, Apr./Jun. 2016, p. 411-38.
34  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 85.
35  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 218.
36  See, e.g., BARANGER, Denis. The language of eternity: judicial review of the amending power in France 
(or the absence thereof ). Israel Law Review, vol. 44, n. 3, Nov./Feb. 2011-12, p. 389-428; PREUSS, Ulrich K. The 
implications of “eternity clauses”: the German experience.’ Israel Law Review, vol. 44, n. 3, Nov./Feb. 2011-12, 
p. 429-88.
37  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 149-58. Yaniv Roznai further identifies what he calls “supra-con-
stitutional” limits derived from natural law and international law. Notably, natural law-based supra-constitu-
tional limits are also discovered and pronounced by the court. ROZNAI, Yaniv. Unconstitutional Constitution-
al Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 71-102. 
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fall in the category of unconstitutional constitutional amendments to be nullified by 
the court ex ante or ex post either for their breaking the unity of the constitution or in-
fringing fundamental substantive normative principles, suggesting a legalistic view of 
transformative and revolutionary constitutional change.38  
Through the lens of Albert’s theory of constitutional dismemberment, the trans-
formative and revolutionary character of formal constitutional changes lies in their 
high impact on the existing constitution, regardless of the politico-sociological forces 
underpinning such changes.39 Yet, Albert’s advocacy for the constitutionalization of 
constitutional dismemberment by differentiating amendment rules in constitutional 
design seems to suggest otherwise. Notably, both Albert’s theory of constitutional 
dismemberment and his proposal for its codification in constitutional design are in-
tended to tame transformative and revolutionary constitutional change by means of 
legal continuity.40 Nevertheless, legal continuity, or rather, legal framing, is not suffi-
cient for the constitutionalization of dismemberment. Rather, Albert suggests that a 
higher degree of “popular consent” is required of constitutional dismemberment than 
of constitutional amendment. Thus, in his designed world of ideal written constitutions, 
the rules for formal constitutional change must be differentiated, requiring a higher 
threshold of agreement for transformative and revolutionary changes, i.e., constitutio-
nal dismemberments.41 
Linking formal constitutional change to democracy, Albert blends his forma-
listic suggestions with substantive value.42 Seen in this light, he is not indifferent to 
the politico-sociological foundation of transformative and revolutionary constitutional 
change. Even so, conformity with the rules as codified in the written constitution takes 
precedence over political legitimacy. The constitution making no distinction between 
constitutional dismemberment and constitutional amendment in its current design, 
a transformative or revolutionary formal constitutional alteration thereof amounts to 
constitutional nullity as it is in essence an unconstitutional constitutional amendment.43 
38  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 218.
39  This echoes Gary Jacobsohn’s view on constitutional revolution. See JACOBSOHN, Gary Jeffrey. Theorizing 
the constitutional revolution. Journal of Law and Courts, vol. 2, n.1, Spring 2014, p. 1-32..
40  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 189-94.
41  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 190, 263-64.
42  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 268-70. For democracy in and of itself as a substantive value, 
see BRETTSCHNEIDER, Corey. The value theory of democracy. Politics, Philosophy & Economics, vol. 5, n. 3, 
Oct./Jan. 2006-07, p. 259-78. Cf. TRIBE, Laurence H. The puzzling persistence of process-based constitutional 
theories. Yale Law Journal, vol. 89, n. 6, 1980, p. 1067-72.
43  While Albert does not take issue with the boundary of constitutional amendment as delimited in the com-
parative jurisprudence on unconstitutional constitutional amendments, he falls short of endorsing the judicial 
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The question is whether such a legalistic understanding of revolutionary constitutional 
change adequately captures the meaning of revolution in the political project of consti-
tutional governance. To answer this question, we need to ask what constitution-making 
is really about. 
With the idea of “new beginning” brought to the fore in her On Revolution, Aren-
dt shed illuminating light on the question of constitution-making at the core of consti-
tutional theory.44 Constitution-making marks a new beginning by concluding the revo-
lution with the foundation of freedom. It is such a new beginning characteristic of the 
foundation of freedom, not the new constitution in writing, that gives meaning to the 
act of constitution-making.45 Thus, constitution-making that sets a constitutional pro-
ject in motion is inseparable from the quest for political freedom. According to Arendt, 
political freedom lies at the core of one of the “three fundamental human activities:…
action.”46 Notably, among “the most general condition[s] of human existence” with whi-
ch “action has the closest connection” is “natality.”47 Elucidating how natality bears on 
the freedom-oriented political action, Arendt remarked, 
“[T]he new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because the 
newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting. In this 
sense of initiative, an element of action, and therefore natality is inherent in all human 
activities.”48 
Being the fountainhead of actions of political freedom, natality thus underlies 
the meaning of revolution in the political project of constitutional governance. Sowing 
the seeds of a new beginning with its inherent “startling unexpectedness,” natality 
invalidation of unconstitutional constitutional amendments for reasons of democracy. See ALBERT, Richard. 
Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2019, p. 217-23. Seen in this light, he does not quite treat an unconstitutional constitutional 
amendment as an act of constitutional nullity. Yet, his suggestions for an ex ante judicial guardianship of the 
boundary of constitutional amendment in the pre-ratification stage envisage judicial prevention of constitu-
tional nullity in respect of formal constitutional alterations. ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: 
Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 223-27. 
44  ARENDT, Hannah. On Revolution. Rep. ed. New York: Penguin, 1990, p. 20-47.
45  ARENDT, Hannah. On Revolution. Rep. ed. New York: Penguin, 1990, p. 144-45. See also PREUSS, Ulrich K. 
Constitutional Revolution: The Link between Constitutionalism and Progress. Translated by Deborah Lucas 
Schneider. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1995, p. 25-37, 110.
46  See ARENDT, Hannah. On Revolution. Rep. ed. New York: Penguin, 1990, p. 30-31, 233-36; ARENDT, Han-
nah. On Revolution. Rep. ed. New York: Penguin, 1990, p. 149-76.
47  ARENDT, Hannah. On Revolution. Rep. ed. New York: Penguin, 1990, p. 8-9. 
48  ARENDT, Hannah. On Revolution. Rep. ed. New York: Penguin, 1990, p. 9.
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further clothed political action in an aura of “miracle.”49 Natality puts political action 
pursuing freedom in tension with rules and forms.50
Through the lens of natality, a revolutionary constitutional change looks very 
different from what Albert has said of constitutional dismemberment. Imagine the 
following two scenarios under a constitution that provides for an undifferentiated 
amendment rule. In the first is a formal constitutional change that alters constitutional 
identity in full conformity with the unitary amendment rule but does not really result 
from deliberation and reflection among members of the political community. From the 
perspective of Albert’s theory, such a change is a straightforward instance of constitu-
tional dismemberment. Through the lens of natality, it is far from the result of revolu-
tionary action of political freedom. Obviously it cannot claim democratic legitimacy 
required of such a grand-scale constitutional alteration. Nor can it be deemed as the 
culmination of a natality-driven political action. Thus, subjecting the imaginary formal 
constitutional change to judicial nullification ex ante or ex post as an ultra vires cons-
titutional amendment does not contradict the meaning of revolution in the political 
project of constitutional governance. 
Alternatively, the same grand-scale constitutional alteration does command ge-
nuine popular support as a result of a robust democratic process and cross the same 
supermajority threshold required of an amendment unquestionably as in the first sce-
nario. In stark contrast to the ought-to-be-nullified amendment in the first scenario, 
the second imaginary constitutional alteration is undoubtedly a function of natality. 
Yet, through the lens of Albert, these two imaginary formal constitutional alterations 
are no different. As in the first scenario, the natality-bred constitutional alteration here 
is subject to ex ante or ex post judicial nullification, too. After all, it breaks the unity of 
the imaginary constitution. Taken together, Albert’s theory of constitutional dismem-
berment not only captures those unfounded attempts to dismember the existing cons-
titution under the pretence of a constitutional new beginning but also extends to ca-
ses of constitutional natality. With revolution recast in legalistic terms, Albert seems to 
embank the underlying human condition of revolutionary politics – natality. Inside the 
embankment of a unitary amendment rule is no place for the stream of constitutional 
natality. Can natality really be tamed by such constitutional embankment? 
Notably, natality-driven political action materializes in the process of consti-
tution-making before it translates into the enacting of a codified constitution.51 Thus, 
49  ARENDT, Hannah. On Revolution. Rep. ed. New York: Penguin, 1990, p. 177, 246-47. 
50  See KAHN, Paul W. The Reign of Law: Marbury v. Madison and the Construction of Law. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1997, p. 54-59, 64-69. This translates into the modern concept of constituent power in con-
stitutional theory. See LOUGHLIN, Martin. The concept of constituent power. European Journal of Political 
Theory, vol. 13, n. 2, Apr./Jun. 2014, p 231-34.
51  ARENDT, Hannah. On Revolution. Rep. ed. New York: Penguin, 1990, p. 141-45. 
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in the foregoing second scenario, constitutional natality has already burst before the 
existing constitution is actually altered. To be precise, it is the lead-up political action, 
not the constitution-dismembering formal change, that breaks the unity of the existing 
constitution. In other words, the old constitutional identity has already been altered in 
the process of political action and counteraction. The eventual change to the constitu-
tional document coming out of the existing amendment rule is merely the end result 
of constitutional identity-altering political action, not the cause of the breakdown of 
constitutional identity. In such a scenario, denying the resulting constitutional change 
the character of constitutional new beginning is far from the preservation of constitu-
tional identity. Rather, condemning it as an unlawful constitutional dismemberment (or 
rather, an unconstitutional constitutional amendment) shows an intransigent attempt 
to restore the ousted identity, despite the new one to which natality has given rise.  
3. WHEN CONSTITUTION-MAKING BECOMES CONSTITUTION-
-WRITING: CONSTITUTIONAL NATALITY DISMEMBERED
Despite no place for identity-altering formal change to the constitution that 
does not provide for rules governing such changes, Albert does allow for constitutional 
new beginning in his theory of constitutional change. Addressing reformers who are 
acting to “make a lawful change of the larger magnitude” that exceeds the boundary of 
constitutional amendment in the majority of the real-word constitutions in which only 
a unitary undifferentiated rule is provided for constitutional amendment, Albert points 
them in the direction of “mak[ing] a new constitution.”52 Notably, the constitution who-
se creation constitutional reformers would “invest time and resources [in with] nontri-
vial risks of failure [incurred]” has to be new not only in substance but also in form: it 
is a constitution with new authorship, new name, and new substance, breaking “legal 
continuity” with that which it is intended to reform.53 Thus, what sets such constitution-
-making apart from the imaginary natality-driven constitutional alteration as discus-
sed in Section II is not whether the latter requires time and resources or not. Nor does 
the foregoing imaginary natality-driven constitutional alteration necessarily incur less 
risks of failure. On the contrary, as will be further discussed, the underlying political ac-
tion may well face more cumbersome challenges in the imaginary scenario, especially 
when the undifferentiated amendment rule requires an exceedingly high threshold of 
52  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 189 (emphasis added).
53  For the role of authorship in constitutional theory, see KUO, Ming-Sung. Cutting the Gordian knot of legiti-
macy theory? an anatomy of Frank Michelman’s presentist critique of constitutional authorship. International 
Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 7, n. 4, Oct./Dec. 2009, p 683-714.
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popular consent,54 than the making of a new constitution as envisaged in Albert’s the-
ory. As a whole, the creation of a new constitutional text is characteristic of Albert’s 
version of constitutional new beginning. 
In line with the formalistic view on constitutional new beginning, Albert pro-
poses that reformers differentiate constitutional rules in terms of three types of formal 
constitutional change in their constitutional design: “rules changeable by amendment, 
rules changeable by dismemberment, and unamendable rules changeable only by cre-
ating a new constitution.”55 The first two are to be explicitly stipulated in the design of 
constitutional rules on formal constitutional alteration, while the last – the repeal or 
replacement of the unamendable rules by constitutional enactment – is a requirement 
by necessary implication. From Albert’s calibration of the threshold of popular consent 
required of formal constitutional changes to their degree of impact on the existing 
constitution, it must be inferred that the threshold for dismemberment needs to re-
flect its transformative and revolutionary character and is thus set higher than that for 
amendment. And, this exposes the limitation of the formalistic conceptualization of 
constitutional new beginning as reflected in Albert’s tripartite classification of constitu-
tional changes: amendment, dismemberment, and enactment.
Suppose that an ideal codified constitution differentiates amendment and dis-
memberment with a provision defining state territory enshrined as the unamendable 
rule as observes Albert’s advice.56 For an amendment, it provides that an amendment 
require the agreement of at least two thirds of the total members of the unicameral par-
liament followed by popular consent with more than one-half of the valid ballots cast in 
favour in a popular referendum. For such a referendum to be valid, the voting rate must 
exceed one-half of the eligible electors. Given the transformative and revolutionary im-
pact of altering suffrage on the constitutional order, the imaginary constitution treats 
any change on suffrage as dismemberment, requiring the agreement of at least three 
quarters of the total members of the unicameral parliament followed by a referendum. 
It requires the number of valid votes in favour exceeding one-half of the total number 
of eligible electors to sanction a dismemberment bill passed by the parliament.57 
54  Apparently this may result in an instance of what Albert calls “constructive unamendability.” ALBERT, Rich-
ard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford and New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 2019, p. 158-59.  
55  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 264.
56  The following thought experiment is designed in light of actual constitutional politics in Taiwan. 
57  This imaginary constitutional design is an adaptation of the amendment rule of the ROC Constitution, 
which is the working constitution of Taiwan. Additional Article 12 provides: “Amendment of the Constitution 
shall be initiated upon the proposal of one-fourth of the total members of the Legislative Yuan, passed by 
at least three-fourths of the members present at a meeting attended by at least three-fourths of the total 
members of the Legislative Yuan, and sanctioned by electors in the free area of the Republic of China at a 
referendum held upon expiration of a six-month period of public announcement of the proposal, wherein the 
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At first glance, the three-tiered design of constitutional change seems to be ide-
al. Upon close examination, however, this model design cannot escape the startling 
unexpectedness posed by constitutional natality. To see why it is so, let us imagine the 
following two scenarios under this imaginary designed constitution.
In the first scenario is a reform proposal to extend suffrage to citizens over the 
age of eighteen but under the age of twenty. Enthusiastically pushed by grassroots 
organizations, this proposal easily passes the high threshold at the parliamentary sta-
ge, with an overwhelming cross-party support.58 Yet, despite the passionate campaign 
and the general support as indicated in serial polls, it eventually falls short in the refe-
rendum stage. With 70% of eligible voters casting their ballots and 70% of the ballots 
cast in favour, this reform only gains the support of 49% of eligible voters short of the 
required one-half threshold, ending up as a failed attempt at constitutional dismem-
berment. Through Albert’s lens, this reform is defeated. Let us suppose that following 
the referendum, the parliament further adopts a unanimous resolution instructing the 
president to promulgate the reform proposal as a valid formal change to the consti-
tution on grounds that the reform bill is essentially a constitutional amendment wi-
thout regard to dismemberment. Through Albert’s lens again, this would amount to 
an unlawful constitutional coup. Yet, when looked at through Arendt’s lens of natality, 
this would evoke a constitutional new beginning. Specifically, the constitutional order 
changes with its democratic foundation reimagined in a genuinely democratic fashion 
by virtue of an exercise of what Bruce Ackerman and Neal Katyal calls “unconventiona-
lity.”59 Condemning it as an unlawful constitutional coup or an unconstitutional consti-
tutional alteration would mean a betrayal of the meaning of constitutional renewal – to 
mark a new beginning of constitutional life. 
To be sure, it may be countered that reformers should opt for constitutional 
enactment instead of going down the foregoing route of unconventional application, 
if not intentional manipulation, of the enshrined rules on constitutional change. Em-
barking on the time-consuming and resources-demanding route of constitutional 
enactment is the right way forward as it would keep the proposed reform on the track 
of lawfulness without contravening the rules set out in the imaginary constitution.60 
number of valid votes in favor exceeds one-half of the total number of electors. The provisions of Article 174 
of the Constitution shall not apply.” For a helpful introduction to the Taiwan constitution, see YEH, Jiunn-rong. 
The Constitution of Taiwan: A Contextual Analysis. Oxford: Hart, 2016. 
58  This is an adaptation of an ongoing development in Taiwan. See TAIWAN likely to pass constitutional 
amendment lowering voting age to 18. Taiwan News, 19 Feb 2020. Available in: <https://www.taiwannews.
com.tw/en/news/3878403>. Last visited: 04/04/2020.
59  Unconventionality in formal constitutional change results from deviation from the constitution rules on 
amendment but without totally disregarding them. See ACKERMAN Bruce; KATYAL, Neal. Our unconventional 
founding. University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 62, n. 2, Spring 1995, p. 558-59.  
60  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 189.
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This rejoinder raises two fundamental issues here. First, it is unclear what it means to be 
lawful to step out of the existing constitutional framework followed by the enactment 
of a new constitution. After all, a new constitution is a creation ex nihilo from the legal 
perspective61 unless some sort of natural law is invoked as the higher law delimiting the 
boundary of constitutional enactment.62 Thus, lawfulness in the rejoinder does not so 
much concern the legality of the proposed reform itself as focuses on assuring that the 
rules on formal constitutional change in the imaginary constitution be complied with 
to the letter. The rule of law project Albert persuasively links to written constitutions is 
manifested in the impeccable adherence to the rules on formal constitutional change.63 
This brings up the second issue. 
The main reason underlying Albert’s proposal to codify identity-altering dis-
memberment alongside amendment in constitutional design is to contain, or rather 
co-opt, transformative and revolutionary changes by means of constitutional incorpo-
ration. In this way, Albert argues, constitutions can change, piecemeal or on a grand sca-
le, within a given institutional framework without breaking legal continuity.64 Viewed 
thus, enabling ordered constitutional transformation or revolution within a continuing 
constitutional framework is the end, while conformity with the rules set out in the cons-
titutional order is the means. Yet, with legal continuity in the context of constitutional 
change conditioned on the impeccable adherence to the rules governing formal cons-
titutional changes, the unconventional reform change in the first scenario would be ba-
nished from the imaginary constitutional framework to the uncharted legal territory of 
constitutional creation ex nihilo. To put it differently, even if an ordered but unconven-
tional constitutional transformation as illustrated in the foregoing reform proposal has 
taken place, its constitutional status remains contingent on the legalistic decision as to 
whether it has been in conformity with the codified rules on constitutional amendment 
and dismemberment in the imaginary constitution. Breaking the “law” of constitutional 
change in the imaginary constitution, it comes down to constitutional nullity. In sum, 
61  FRIED, Charles. The Supreme Court, 1994 Term – foreword: revolutions?. Harvard Law Review, vol. 109, n. 
1, Nov. 1995, p. 18.
62  The German Federal Constitutional Court alluded to the possibility of the original constitutional provisions 
being unlawful in the Southwest Case ((1951) I BverfGE 225). See ROZNAI, Yaniv. Unconstitutional Constitu-
tional Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 76. Notably, 
a constitutional creation ex nihilo does not mean constitutional chaos. LOUGHLIN, Martin. The concept of con-
stituent power. European Journal of Political Theory, vol. 13, n. 2, Apr./Jun. 2014, p. 229. See also MICHEL-
MAN, Frank I. Always Under Law. Constitutional Commentary, vol. 12, n. 2, Summer 1995, p. 227-47. Yet, it is 
one thing to say that it is orderly; it is another to say that it is lawful in the same sense as a lawful constitutional 
amendment or dismemberment. Lawfulness in the latter presupposes some pre-existing legal criteria, which 
is not contemptible with the idea of creation ex nihilo.  
63  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 269-71.
64  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 188-94, 263-64, 268-69.
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Albert’s emphasis on the importance of legal continuity in constitutional renewal is not 
so much about institutional continuity that channels constitutional transformation in 
an orderly way as about compliance with the rules on formal constitutional change. The 
means becomes the end.  
The foregoing scenario indicates that the functioning of legal continuity in ta-
ming transformative and revolutionary constitutional alteration relies not only on con-
formity with the rules but also on the continuation of the institutional framework. What 
is missing from the tripartite classification of constitutional change is the recognition 
that the constitutional form of legal continuity will have to face the rule-challenging 
popular quest for constitutional renewal.65 Failing to appreciate this real-world consti-
tutional phenomenon, insistence on conformity with the codified dismemberment rule 
may unexpectedly pit legal continuity against the taming of transformative and revo-
lutionary constitutional change as illustrated in the first scenario. Nevertheless, Albert’s 
proposed design on the rules governing formal constitutional change may be othe-
rwise defended in the following line: a transformative or revolutionary constitutional 
change must show its seriousness by going through the arduous process of creating 
a constitution ex nihilo as alluded to in the differentiation of amendment, dismember-
ment, and enactment. How far this line of argument can go will transpire in light of the 
second scenario of constitutional reform. 
Suppose that the government has exercised effective control only over a fron-
tier island province of the entire state territory defined in the imaginary constitution 
over the past seven decades. Numerous polls also constantly indicate that over three-
-quarters of the people support the idea to redefine state territory in the constitution to 
close the gap between political reality and constitutional definition. As indicated abo-
ve, the provision for state territory is codified as an unamendable rule in the imaginary 
constitution. Looked at through Albert’s lens, the only “lawful” way to redefine state 
territory in constitutional terms is down the failure-prone, time-consuming, and resour-
ces-demanding route of constitutional creation ex nihilo. But is the route of enactment 
really more arduous than that of amendment, not to mention dismemberment? 
Imagine that, in order to adopt a new constitution with state territory redefined 
in line with the islands under the government effective control, the reformers follow 
Albert’s advice and convene a constituent assembly with all societal sectors fully repre-
sented. Yet, although the change on state territory commands robust popular support 
65  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 268-69. Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès made this point of revolu-
tionary constitution-making in the context of the French Revolution. SIEYÈS, Emmanuel Joseph. What Is the 
Third Estate? Translated by M. Blondel. London: Pall Mall Press, 1963, p. 127-28. See also KAHN, Paul W. The 
Reign of Law: Marbury v. Madison and the Construction of Law. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997, p. 69-
74; LOUGHLIN, Martin. The concept of constituent power. European Journal of Political Theory, vol. 13, n. 2, 
Apr./Jun. 2014, p. 227, 231-32.
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and has been the impetus for this imaginary effort of constitutional renewal, public 
opinion is divided over other issues that need to be stipulated in a constitution such as 
whether the office of presidency should be ceremonial or executive. Even so, the cons-
tituent assembly adopts a new constitution with the support of two-thirds of the total 
delegates and subjects it to a referendum for popular approval. With 75% of eligible 
voters taking part in the referendum, the proposed new constitution is approved with 
55% of total ballots cast in favour of its adoption. From the perspective of democracy, 
this imaginary new constitution has fairly popular support, marking a legitimate cons-
titutional new beginning. Nevertheless, compared to the reform proposal to extend 
suffrage in the first scenario, this constitutional enactment is less cumbersome than 
dismemberment as well as amendment. With the benefit of institutional continuity de-
prived, this exercise of constitutional creation ex nihilo is prone to more risks. Under the 
differentiated rules on formal constitutional change modelled after Albert’s proposed 
constitutional design, the most transformative and revolutionary constitutional altera-
tion can be less time-consuming and resources-demanding than its lesser variety but 
remains equally risky.   
Taken together, the foregoing two scenarios of constitutional reform suggest 
that compartmentalization of constitutional changes in constitutional design with 
constitutional new beginning consigned to the extraconstitutional route of enactment 
can stand in the way of genuine constitutional renewal. It may even contradict the goal 
of taming transformative and revolutionary constitutional changes with the institutio-
nal constraints of legal continuity. To make things more complicated, if a new consti-
tution is simply promulgated with the ostensible democratic support expressed in a 
plebiscite-like popular vote, it would be fair to assume that this creation ex nihilo would 
still qualify as a constitutional new beginning under Albert’s tripartite classification of 
constitutional changes. In this way, the writing of a new constitution marks the most 
revolutionary and radical form of constitutional change and the beginning of a novel 
constitutional order, thereby hollowing out the meaning of constitution-making.
 As Arendt perceptively observed nearly sixty years ago, constitution-making is 
not only about the making of law. It is also a political act that “constitutes” the political 
order and the people.66 Constitution-making is constitutive because it is engendered 
by political action that is powered by one of the general conditions of human existen-
ce – natality. As the foregoing imaginary constitutional order shows, Albert’s designed 
world of ideal written constitutions assumes an orderly expression of desires for cons-
titutional reform. They are expected to find their place in the respective designated 
66  See ARENDT, Hannah. On Revolution. Rep. ed. New York: Penguin, 1990, p. 145; PREUSS, Ulrich K. Constitu-
tional Revolution: The Link between Constitutionalism and Progress. Translated by Deborah Lucas Schneider. 
Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1995, p. 109-10. Cf. ROSENFELD, Michel. The Identity of the Consti-
tutional Subject: Selfhood, Citizenship, Culture, and Community. Abingdon: Routledge, 2009.
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constitutional channels. Yet, this is not the way that the world of politics operates. Rather, 
politics always plays out in a way startling its observers, defying existing frameworks, 
and continuing to bother institutional designers.67 Against this backdrop and throu-
gh the lens of Albert’s constitutional design, an Arendtian constitution-making may 
well be either condemned as unlawful within an Albertine constitution or banished to 
an exercise of constitution-writing from without. While an Albertine constitution only 
envisages a dismembered constitutional natality that is tameable by constitutional de-
sign, the meaning of constitutional renewal is hollowed out with constitution-writing 
taking the place of constitution-making in Constitutional Amendments.68 
4. IN LIEU OF CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTION-MAKING IS MORE 
THAN CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Once left on the margin of the landscape of comparative law, constitutions have 
recently generated great interest from comparatists.69 To be more precise, not only cons-
titutions themselves but also constitutional phenomena become objects of comparati-
ve constitutional studies. How they are interpreted by judges, how they are applied by 
politicians, how robust their protection of fundamental right is, how state powers are 
organized and allocated in constitutional terms, and so on all appear in various venues, 
including monograph series and specialized journals. Constitutional change and cons-
titutional design are no exception. With his encyclopaedic knowledge of comparative 
constitutional amendments, Albert has helped us to see the nuances of formal consti-
tutional alterations more clearly with his tremendous “Constitutional Amendments’’ and 
theoretical discovery – the concept of constitutional dismemberment.
I have shown that drawing upon comparative constitutions, Albert not only pro-
vides us constitutional scholars with a more sophisticated analytic framework of cons-
titutional change but also pitches constitutional practitioners in the design of rules on 
constitutional change with his concept of constitutional dismemberment among other 
67  KAHN, Paul W. The Reign of Law: Marbury v. Madison and the Construction of Law. New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1997, p. 64-74; LOUGHLIN, Martin. The concept of constituent power. European Journal of Po-
litical Theory, vol. 13, n. 2, Apr./Jun. 2014, p. 231-34. Conscious of the political character of the constitutional 
project, Albert nonetheless envisages a tamed political world. See ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amend-
ments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 
269.
68  Albert notes constitution as an action through which consent is renewed and the constitutional order is 
continually re-legitimated. Nevertheless, he only allows for such action within the limits of the designed rules 
on constitutional change. ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing 
Constitutions. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 195-96. 
69  Compare, TWINING, William. Globalisation and Legal Scholarship. Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 
2011, p. 21, with HIRSCHL, Ran. Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law. 
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 77-78.
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comparative insights.70 This is an exemplar of joining theory and practice. Yet, with 
Albert’s role moving from constitutional comparatist to constitutional practice and 
design adviser, constitutional dismemberment raises more questions than answers. 
Applying constitutional dismemberment to real-world constitutions that provide for 
only a set of unitary undifferentiated rules on formal constitutional changes, it may 
still fall under the spell of the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment. 
With all identity-altering constitutional changes under such constitutions condemned 
as unlawful constitutional dismemberments (or rather unconstitutional constitutional 
amendments), constitutional changes that would give rise to new meaning and identi-
ty resulting from natality-powered political action are turned into constitutional nulli-
ty. Moreover, when translated into constitutional design, the concept of constitutional 
dismemberment and the concomitant tripartite classification of constitutional changes 
– amendment, dismemberment, and enactment – will likely fall short of taming trans-
formative and revolutionary constitutional alternations. Politics that gives meaning to 
the constitution characteristically defies predetermined rules and challenges designed 
forms.71 Failing to appreciate the free flow of natality Arendt perceptively identified in 
the condition of human existence, a scientific, theory-based design on constitutional 
change of Albert’s sophisticated kind mistakes constitution-writing and constitutional 
design for constitution-making, hollowing out the meaning of constitutional renewal.
The foregoing observation does not mean that constitutional design is not im-
portant to constitution-making. Nor does it suggest that constitutional design needs 
no theoretical guidance or comparative insight. Yet, to do justice to the constitutional 
project, we must take the phenomenon of constitution-making and its concomitant 
real-world politics seriously. As with many fellow travellers in comparative constitutio-
nal studies, Albert focuses on comparative written constitutions rather than compara-
tive constitutional phenomena.72 The writing of constitutional codes stands front and 
center, eclipsing the big picture of intricate constitutional phenomena relating to the 
making of a constitutional order. As a result, “written constitutionalism” steers the the-
ory, which is further applied to defend the former.73 By transcending the fascination 
70  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 229-60.
71  KAHN, Paul W. The Reign of Law: Marbury v. Madison and the Construction of Law. New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1997, p. 69-74; LOUGHLIN, Martin. The concept of constituent power. European Journal of Po-
litical Theory, vol. 13, n. 2, Apr./Jun. 2014, p. 231-32. See also KAHN, Paul W. Political Theology: Four New 
Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.
72  KUO, Ming-Sung. A dubious Montesquieuian moment in constitutional scholarship: reading the empirical 
turn in comparative constitutional law in the light of William Twining and his hero. Transnational Legal Theo-
ry, vol. 4, n. 4, 2013, p. 491-93. 
73  KUO, Ming-Sung. A dubious Montesquieuian moment in constitutional scholarship: reading the empirical 
turn in comparative constitutional law in the light of William Twining and his hero. Transnational Legal Theo-
ry, vol. 4, n. 4, 2013, p. 493-501.
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with well-styled constitutions and bringing unwieldy, flowing constitutional natality to 
the attention of comparatists,74 Albert will enrich general theory of constitutional chan-
ge even more with his landmark contribution of Constitutional Amendments. 
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